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According to a view that I will call ‘attributor virtue epistemology’ (‘AVE’ for short), S 
knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue, 
competence, or ability that she possesses. AVE captures a wide range of our intuitions 
about the nature and value of knowledge, and it has many able defenders. 1 
Unfortunately, it has an unrecognized consequence that many epistemologists will think 
is sufficient for rejecting it—namely, it makes knowledge depend on factors that are not 
truth-relevant, even in the broadest sense of this term, and it also makes knowledge depend 
in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant in the more common narrow 
sense of this term. As I will show below, this means that the primary objection to 
interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more 
effectively against AVE. In §1, I draw out a consequence of AVE for a pair of cases 
involving perception. In §2, I use these cases to show how AVE makes knowledge 
depend in counterintuitive ways on truth-relevant and truth-irrelevant factors. In §3, I 
respond to objection. And finally, in §4, I comment on the relationship between AVE, 
truth-irrelevant factors, and epistemically irrelevant factors. (This article also contains an 
appendix, where I argue that exactly the same considerations apply to the proper 
functionalism views defended by Plantinga (1993, 2000), Bergmann (2006), and others.)   
1. Virtuous Belief and External Agency 
For the sake of simplicity, I will focus in the first instance on Sosa’s version of AVE. 
While there are important differences between Sosa’s view and other versions of AVE, it 
will be clear below how the lessons I draw for Sosa’s view apply to any non-skeptical 
version of AVE.  
According to Sosa (2007, 2009, 2011), knowledge is apt belief. A belief is apt just in 
case it’s accurate because adroit. Accurate belief is just true belief, and beliefs are adroit 
just in case they are products of intellectual virtues, competences or skills possessed by 
the people who have them. Many questions arise about the because relation at the heart of 
                                                            
1 Prominent attributor virtue epistemologists include Ernest Sosa (2007, 2009, 2011), John Greco (2003, 2010), 






Sosa’s view, but I will focus on the virtues themselves, and on the corresponding 
property of being adroit. Compare the following cases.   
Actual World: I’m a pretty normal guy, and like most people I can tell when I’m 
out of coffee. I just have to look and see. A moment ago, I looked to see whether 
my mug was empty and I saw that it was.  
Demon World: I’m a pretty normal guy, and like most people I can tell when I’m 
out of coffee. I just have to look and see. But unfortunately, I’m occasionally the 
victim of an evil demon. This demon is pretty weird. She loves true belief, but 
hates adroit belief. When she’s at work, she ensures that her victims have true 
beliefs that aren’t products of any intellectual virtues, competences, or skills that 
they possess. If her victims lack the relevant virtues, then she gives them true 
beliefs that they wouldn’t have had if she had left them alone. But if her victims 
have the relevant virtues, she preempts those virtues. In these cases, she gives her 
victims exactly the true beliefs they would have had if left to their own devices, 
but she ensures that these beliefs are products of her own doing, rather than 
products of her victims’ intellectual virtues. Right now, I believe that my mug is 
empty, just as in the actual world, and again my belief is true. But unbeknownst 
to me, my belief this time isn’t the product of my ability to tell whether my mug 
is empty. A moment ago, I looked in my mug to see whether it was empty and I 
acquired the belief that it was. But the instant before I would have formed this 
belief on my own, the demon zapped me (or did whatever it is that evil demons 
do) and directly caused the belief. So while my belief is true, it’s not the product 
of any intellectual virtue, competence or skill that I possess. Instead it’s entirely 
the product of the demon’s machinations.  
The demon world is a pretty strange place, but like many strange places discussed by 
philosophers (Twin Earth, Swampman’s bog, Mary’s colorless room, etc.), it illustrates a 
point. Suppose I know that my mug is empty here in the actual world, and suppose that 
the demon world is identical to the actual world except for the stipulated interference of 
the demon. In both worlds, I believe that my mug is empty. But in the demon world, my 
belief can’t be an instance of knowledge, if Sosa’s view is true, since it’s due entirely to 
the work of the demon, and thus not the product of any virtue, competence, or ability 
that I possess. This means that, on Sosa’s view, I know that my mug is empty here in the 
actual world, but I don’t know this in the demon world.  
This conclusion is not an unanticipated consequence of Sosa’s view. Indeed, the 
demon world takes its inspiration from Sosa’s solution to the value problem. According 






does not explain the fact that we would prefer a life of knowing, where we gain truth through our 
own intellectual performance, to a life where we are visited with just as much truth but through mere 
external agency (brainwashing, hypnosis, subliminal suggestion, etc.). … We do not want just truth that 
is given to us by happenstance, or by some alien agency, where we are given a belief that hits the mark 
of truth not through our own performance, not through any accomplishment creditable to us. … We 
want rather to attain truth by our own performance. (pp. 173-4)  
On Sosa’s view, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because knowledge is 
apt belief and apt belief requires that one has arrived at the truth through one’s own 
performance, not through the work of some external agency. In the demon world, 
however, I arrive at the truth not through my own performance but through the work of 
the demon, so my belief that my mug is empty seems exactly the sort of belief that Sosa 
means to classify as inapt. Sosa, it seems, should be happy with the conclusion that I 
don’t know that my mug is empty in the demon world.  
Of course, Sosa’s version of AVE is not the only version of AVE that entails this 
conclusion. According to every version of AVE, S’s true belief that p counts as 
knowledge only if it is attributable to some intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that 
she possesses. But in the demon world, I have not arrived at the truth with respect to the 
question whether my mug is empty because I am intellectually virtuous, competent, or 
skilled. The demon would have given me the same belief even if I were completely 
unable to tell whether my mug was empty, and my ability to tell whether my mug is 
empty played no role (causal or otherwise) in the actual formation of my belief.  
It is important to notice that, in the demon world, I am not responding to the 
testimony of the demon, or anything like that. The idea isn’t that the demon causes me 
to form the belief by whispering in my ear that my mug is empty and then letting me 
form the belief on the basis of her testimony, or that she causes me to form the belief by 
providing some stimulus that I respond to by forming the belief, in such a way that my 
response can be considered the product of some virtue that I possess. Instead, let’s 
suppose, the causal path goes directly from the demon to the belief. If physicalism is 
true, she puts me in whatever physical state I would have been in had she left me alone 
and I had formed the belief on my own. If dualism is true, she puts me in whatever non-
physical state I would have been in had she left me alone. This is the idea. The crucial 
point is that, in the demon world, my belief that my mug is empty—whatever exactly this 
belief amounts to (some C-fiber firing, or whatever it might be)—is not attributable to 
any virtue that I possess. Since AVE says that I know my mug is empty only if my belief 
is attributable to some virtue that I possess, every version of AVE entails that I don’t 
know that my mug is empty in the demon world. And since every non-skeptical version 






the actual world, every non-skeptical version of AVE entails that I know that my mug is 
empty in the actual world but not in the demon world.  
From here forward, by ‘AVE,’ I will mean non-skeptical versions of virtue epistemology 
according to which S knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some 
intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that she possesses. On this usage, every version 
of AVE says that I know that my mug is empty in the actual world but not in the demon 
world. Is this is a problem for AVE, then? I think it is. But I don’t think that the demon 
world gives us a counterexample to AVE. Or, at least, my argument against AVE will not 
rest on any intuition that, in the demon world, I do know that my mug is empty. Instead, 
I will argue that the demon world highlights certain theoretical difficulties for AVE—
specifically, that it makes knowledge depend on truth-irrelevant factors in a very broad 
sense, and that it also makes knowledge depend in the wrong way on factors that are 
truth-relevant even in the narrow sense. The force of this objection may be opaque in 
this context, but it becomes clear against the backdrop of the pragmatic encroachment 
debate.   
2. Truth-Relevance, Broad and Narrow  
The pragmatic encroachment debate focuses on the question whether knowledge 
depends in any interesting way on our practical interests. Pragmatists answer ‘yes’ while 
purists answer ‘no.’2 The standard reason for rejecting pragmatism is that it makes 
knowledge depend on truth-irrelevant factors. A factor is truth-relevant with respect to S’s 
belief that p just in case it affects the probability that her belief is true, if not from her 
own point of view, then from some more objective perspective.3 A factor is truth-
irrelevant with respect to S’s belief that p, then, just in case it does not affect the 
probability that her belief is true, either from her own point of view, or from any more 
objective perspective. According to purists, it is both strongly counterintuitive and 
contrary to traditional epistemology that knowledge could depend on truth-irrelevant 
                                                            
2 The labels ‘pragmatism’ and ‘purism’ come from Fantl and McGrath 2009. Paradigm defenses of pragmatism 
include Fantl and McGrath 2002, Hawthorne 2004, Stanley 2005, Ganson 2008, Fantl and McGrath 2009, 
Weatherson 2012, Schroeder 2012, and Ross and Schroeder 2014. Paradigm defenses of purism include Neta 
2007, Brown 2008, Nagel 2008, DeRose 2009, Nagel 2010, Fumerton 2010, Reed 2010, Brown 2012, Neta 
2012, Cohen 2012, Reed 2012, Brown 2013, and Reed 2014. 
3 This is the standard definition of truth-relevance, and it comes initially from Jason Stanley (2005: 1). Stanley’s 
own term is ‘truth conducive factors.’ Other common terms include ‘truth related factors,’ ‘truth connected 
factors,’ ‘truth directed factors,’ and even ‘epistemically relevant factors.’ I owe the term ‘truth-relevant factors’ 
to Keith DeRose (2009: 25). Of course, in defining ‘truth-relevance’ this way, Stanley and others mean to 
ignore the probability of p conditional on S’s total knowledge, since anything that affects whether S knows that p 






factors. Baron Reed, for example, opens a recent argument with the following 
comments.  
One of the central questions that epistemologists have attempted to answer is this: when someone 
knows something, what explains or grounds that knowledge? Many different answers have been 
given—for example, clear and distinct perception, evidence, sense experience, reliable belief-
producing processes—and the differences between them should not be ignored. But it is interesting 
to note that all of these answers agree in at least one respect: they are all focused on something that is 
truth directed. For example, evidence is thought to be an indication of what the truth is, reliable 
belief-forming processes are reliable insofar as they tend to produce true beliefs, and so forth. 
Traditionally, this point of agreement was so widely and deeply shared that epistemologists never 
really thought about it. It has been given a name—intellectualism or purism—only recently and only 
by the relatively small number of philosophers [i.e. pragmatists] who have argued against it. (2014: 95) 
Similarly, Keith DeRose frames his arguments against pragmatism with these comments.  
Which features of a subject’s situation are relevant to whether that subject knows some fact to be the 
case? … One who takes [non-evidential factors such as the reliability of a belief forming process] to 
be relevant to knowledge can still uphold the highly intuitive thesis that Jason Stanley has helpfully 
isolated and labelled ‘intellectualism,’ according to which the factors in virtue of which a true belief 
amounts to knowledge are exclusively truth-relevant, in the sense that they affect how likely it is that 
the belief is true, either from the point of view of the subject or from a more objective vantage point. 
… Recently, however, a number of epistemologists, including Stanley himself, have held that factors 
about a subject’s situation that are not even in this broad sense truth-relevant can be relevant to 
whether that subject knows. (2009: 23-5) 
And, as Stephen Grimm points out, even prominent pragmatists agree that it is 
counterintuitive and contrary to traditional epistemology that knowledge depends on 
truth-irrelevant factors. (By ‘practicalism,’ Grimm means pragmatism.)  
According to “orthodox” epistemology, it has recently been said, whether or not a true belief amounts 
to knowledge depends exclusively on truth-related factors: for example, on whether the true belief was 
formed in a reliable way, or was supported by good evidence, and so on. Jason Stanley (2005) refers to 
this as the “intellectualist” component of orthodox epistemology, and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew 
McGrath (2007 and forthcoming; cf. 2002) describe it as orthodox epistemology’s commitment to a 
“purely epistemic” account of knowledge—that is, an account of knowledge where only truth-related 
factors figure in whether or not a person knows. … [P]racticalism is the view that whether a given 
true belief amounts to knowledge depends on the satisfaction of certain non-truth-related factors—in 
particular (it seems), it depends on whether or not the belief is appropriately responsive to the 
practical cost of being wrong. If its advocates are to be believed, practicalism is therefore meant to be 
a radical departure from traditional epistemology. If the language of orthodoxy is indeed apt, it is 






As these passages suggest, there is widespread agreement that, all else equal, theories of 
knowledge lose plausibility for making knowledge depend on truth-irrelevant factors. 
It is worth pointing out, then, that AVE makes knowledge depend on truth-irrelevant 
factors. As we saw above, AVE entails that I know that my mug is empty here in the 
actual world but do not know this in the demon world. So notice now that there needn’t 
be any truth-relevant difference between the actual world and the demon world with 
respect to my belief that my mug is empty. These differences aren’t truth-relevant unless 
they affect the probability that my belief is true, if not from my own perspective, then at 
least from some other more objective epistemically relevant perspective. But we can 
stipulate that there is no difference between the demon world and the actual world in 
terms of my credence that my mug is empty, my evidence for and against the proposition 
that my mug is empty, the reliability of the process that produced my belief that my mug 
is empty, the safety of my belief that my mug is empty, and so on.4 We don’t beg any 
questions against AVE by building these details into the cases. On the intended 
understanding of both cases, the probability that my belief is true in the actual world is 
identical to the probability that my belief is true in the demon world, from both my 
perspective and from any more objective epistemically relevant perspective. But this 
means that there isn’t any truth-relevant difference between the actual world and the 
demon world with respect to my belief that my mug is empty. So, if AVE is true, we 
have a difference in knowledge without any difference in truth-relevant factors. And this 
is exactly how pragmatism makes knowledge depend on truth-irrelevant factors—by 
generating pairs of cases that differ in terms of knowledge but not in terms of any truth-
relevant factor. If purists are correct that we should reject pragmatism because it makes 
knowledge depend on truth-irrelevant factors, then it looks like we should reject AVE 
for the same reason.  
This problem will strike many epistemologists as bad enough. In fact, however, AVE 
fairs even worse than pragmatism with respect to worries about the dependence of 
                                                            
4 Of course the process responsible for my belief that my mug is empty in the demon world isn’t the same 
process as the one responsible for my actual belief that my mug is empty, but this does not prevent us from 
stipulating that these processes are equally reliable. Notice also that, even if K = E and the proposition that 
mug is empty is therefore part of my total evidence here in the actual world, the proposition that my mug is 
empty needn’t be part of my evidence for and against the proposition that my mug is empty. (Intuitively, the 
proposition that my mug is empty isn’t part of my evidence for and against this very proposition even if it is 
part of my total evidence.) So, even if I know that my mug is empty in the actual world but not the demon 
world, the claim that K = E needn’t conflict with the stipulation that my evidence for and against the 
proposition that my mug is empty in the demon world is identical to my actual evidence for and against the 






knowledge truth-relevant factors. 5  As Grimm (2011) observes, when weighing the 
objection that pragmatism makes knowledge depend on truth-irrelevant factors, it is 
important to note how it makes knowledge depend on truth-irrelevant factors. Consider 
the following familiar cases.  
Low Stakes: Hannah is driving past the bank on Friday afternoon. She has her 
paycheck in hand and she plans to deposit it, but there are long lines so she 
decides to deposit her paycheck on Saturday morning while she’s out running 
errands. She knows that it does not matter much when she deposits the paycheck.  
High Stakes: Hannah is driving past the bank on Friday afternoon. She has her 
paycheck in hand and she plans to deposit it, but there are long lines so she 
considers returning to deposit her paycheck on Saturday morning. She believes 
that the bank will be open until noon on Saturday, just as in Low Stakes, but in 
this case she knows that there will be disastrous consequences if she does not 
deposit her check before noon on Saturday.6 
According to paradigm versions of pragmatism, Hannah’s belief that the bank will be 
open counts as knowledge in Low Stakes, but the stipulated differences in her practical 
interests prevent this belief from counting as knowledge in High Stakes. These stipulated 
differences do not take her out of position to know that the bank will be open by 
affecting her evidence for and against the proposition that the bank will be open. She has 
exactly the same evidence for and against this proposition in both Low Stakes and High 
Stakes. Instead, the stipulated differences in Hannah’s practical interests take her out of 
position to know that the bank will be open by raising the amount of evidence required for her to 
know that the bank will be open.7 In fact, according to these versions of pragmatism, the 
stipulated differences in Hannah’s practical interests do not affect any relevant probability 
that Hannah’s belief that the bank will be open is true. All of the relevant probabilities 
are the same in both Low Stakes and High Stakes. For at least the probability that the 
bank will be open conditional on Hannah’s evidence for and against this proposition, 
however, they do affect whether it is probable enough that Hannah’s belief that the bank will 
                                                            
5 To put my cards on the table, I actually think it’s no strike against a view that it makes knowledge depend on 
truth-irrelevant factors, since I think any plausible theory of knowledge will entail that knowledge depends on 
truth-irrelevant factors. (See Roeber 2016, for example.) 
6 See DeRose 1992, p. 913, and Stanley 2005, pp. 2-3. 
7 The standard explanation for this change usually runs in terms of the amount of evidence required for 
Hannah to rationally act as if the bank will be open, which differs from Low Stakes to High Stakes. See, for 






be open is true.8 This distinction between factors that determine the probability that 
some belief is true and factors that determine whether it is probable enough that some 
belief is true is important because the latter factors (whatever they turn out to be) are 
clearly epistemically relevant even if they are not strictly speaking truth-relevant.9  
Henceforth, let’s say that a factor is truth-relevant in the narrow sense just in case it 
affects the probability that the relevant belief is true, and let’s say that a factor is truth-
relevant in the broad sense just in case it either affects the probability that the relevant belief 
is true, affects whether it is probable enough that this belief is true, or affects whether the 
agent has this belief in the first place. Truth-irrelevant factors in the broad sense will be 
factors that neither affect the probability that the relevant belief is true, nor affect 
whether it is probable enough that this belief is true, nor affect whether the agent has the 
belief. As Grimm points out (ibid), paradigm versions of pragmatism make knowledge 
depend on truth-irrelevant factors in the narrow sense, but they don’t make knowledge 
depend on truth-irrelevant factors in the broad sense, since they entail that practical 
interests will only affect knowledge when they affect whether it is probable enough that 
the belief in question is true, not by affecting the probability that this belief is true, but 
instead by moving some relevant threshold.  
While pragmatism makes knowledge depend on factors that aren’t truth-relevant in 
the narrow sense, AVE makes knowledge depend on factors that aren’t truth-relevant 
even in the broad sense. Again, compare my actual belief that my mug is empty to my 
belief that my mug is empty in the demon world. As we have already seen, there needn’t 
be any difference between the demon world and the actual world in terms of my 
credence that my mug is empty, my evidence that my mug is empty, the reliability of the 
process that produced my belief that my mug is empty, the safety of my belief that my 
mug is empty, and so on. So now notice that there needn’t be any difference between the 
demon world and the actual world in terms of any relevant thresholds, either. The 
minimum credence consistent with my knowing that my mug is empty, the minimum 
amount of evidence required for knowing that my mug is empty, the minimum levels of 
reliability or safety consistent with my knowing this, etc., might be exactly as high in the 
demon world as they are in the actual world. Thus, for any relevant probability, the 
minimum probability that is consistent with knowledge might be exactly as high in the 
demon world as it is in the actual world. Indeed, since the demon world and the actual 
world only differ with respect to the stipulated activity of the demon, the demon world 
                                                            
8 By “it is probable enough that Hannah’s belief is true,” I mean that the probability that her belief is true 
(whatever exactly it is) does not entail that Hannah does not know that the bank will be open. Her belief 
satisfies whatever probabilistic requirements there are on knowledge.  






and the actual world are presumably identical with respect to whatever factors set the 
minimum relevant probabilities consistent with knowledge. But as we saw above, if any 
version of AVE is true, then I know that my mug is empty here in the actual world but 
not in the demon world. The upshot is that, while pragmatism only makes knowledge 
depend on factors that aren’t truth-relevant in the narrow sense, AVE makes knowledge 
depend on factors that aren’t truth-relevant even in the broad sense, since it makes 
knowledge depend on factors that affect neither the probability that the belief in 
question is true, nor whether it is probable enough that this belief is true, nor whether I 
hold this belief in the first place.  
In fact, we can press these worries about truth-relevance even further. There are only 
two ways a factor can affect the probability that my belief is true: positively or 
negatively—positively just in case it raises the probability that my belief is true, and 
negatively just in case it lowers the probability that my belief is true. Truth-irrelevant 
factors have no affect on the probability that a belief is true. If it’s hard to believe that 
truth-irrelevant factors can disqualify my belief from counting as knowledge, it’s surely 
much harder to believe that factors that only positively affect the probability that my belief 
is true can disqualify it from counting as knowledge. But this is exactly what AVE entails. 
Just imagine that the demon never gives anyone a false belief, so that my belief in the 
demon world is the product of a perfectly reliable, completely infallible process. Then, if 
AVE is true, there are facts about my belief in the demon world that make it literally 
certain that my belief is true, and yet these facts disqualify my belief from counting as 
knowledge. But intuitively, the relationship between knowledge and truth goes the other 
way around. Intuitively, factors that make it certain that my belief is true should only 
count in favor of my belief’s being an instance of knowledge. So, it seems, AVE not only 
makes knowledge depend on factors that aren’t truth-relevant in even the broad sense, it 
also makes knowledge depend in the wrong way on factors that are truth-relevant in the 
narrow sense.   
3.  Belief, Agency, and the Scope of AVE 
At this point, readers sympathetic to Sosa’s idea that belief is a species of performance 
(2011: 1), or sympathetic to his distinction between functional and judgmental belief and 
his subsequent emphasis on the latter (2015: 51-2), might be tempted to respond to the 
arguments in §2 in one of two ways. First, they might be tempted to say that, because a 
mental state which isn’t the product of my own agency can’t be one of my beliefs (or one 
of my beliefs), I lack knowledge in the demon world for the mundane reason that I lack 






to judgemental beliefs (beliefs that are products of my own agency), so that AVE doesn’t 
say anything about my belief in the demon world.  
Both responses avoid the conclusions of §2, but neither response is very satisfying. Of 
course, Sosa himself would not agree with the first response, since he thinks that 
“brainwashing, hypnosis, subliminal suggestion, etc.,” might give us beliefs that aren’t 
products of our own agency (2003: 173). More importantly, the first response saddles its 
proponent with an implausible theory of mind. By hypothesis, if physicalism is true, the 
evil demon puts me in whatever physical state I would have been in had she left me 
alone and I had formed the belief that my mug is empty on my own, in exactly the way 
that I normally form such beliefs. And by hypothesis, if dualism is true, then she puts me 
in whatever non-physical state I would have been in had she left me alone and I had 
formed this belief the regular way. By hypothesis, there is no difference between the 
demon world and the actual world in terms of any of my dispositions. By hypothesis, I 
am disposed to assert that my mug is empty here in the actual world iff I am disposed to 
assert this in the demon world, I am disposed to affirm that my mug is empty here in the 
actual world iff I am disposed to affirm this in the demon world, I am disposed to use 
the proposition that my mug is empty as a premise in practical or theoretical reasoning 
here in the actual world iff I am disposed to do this in the demon world, and so on. Nor 
is there is any difference between the demon world and the actual world in terms of any 
of my desires, any of my intentions, any of my actions, any of my inferences, or anything 
like that. By hypothesis, if I desire to get more coffee here in the actual world, form the 
intention to get more coffee, and then walk over to the pot, I do all of this in the demon 
world too. Whatever test either of us might perform to see if I believe that my mug is 
empty here in the actual world, I would pass this test in exactly the same way in the 
demon world. A truth serum wouldn’t reveal any difference between the demon world 
and the actual world. Nor would picking up my mug and turning it upside down over my 
computer, or anything like that. A CAT scan would show exactly the same thing in the 
demon world as it would show here in the actual world, and so on. This is all true on the 
intended understanding of the cases. Given all this, however, it seems implausible that I 
don’t believe that my mug is empty in the demon world simply because, in the demon 
world, my mental state is not the product of my own agency. So, it seems doubtful that 
the first reply will work.  
The obvious problem with the second reply, however, is that it just changes the 
subject. Granted, the demon world doesn’t cause any problem for the claim that, if S’s 
belief that p is the product of her own agency, then she knows that p only if her belief that 
p is attributable to some intellectual virtue that she possesses. After all, this claim doesn’t 






not the claim that I am arguing against. I am arguing against the claim that S knows that 
p only if her belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue that she possesses, and 
the demon world does cause trouble for this claim. Since, by ‘AVE,’ I just mean non-
skeptical versions of virtue epistemology according to which S knows that p only if her 
belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue she possesses, the demon world 
causes trouble for AVE. This conclusion would not be very interesting if AVE were just 
a straw person and it had no defenders, of course. But as I pointed out in the opening 
paragraph of this paper, AVE has many prominent defenders. So neither objection 
works.  
At this point, attributor virtue epistemologists might reply that it’s just intuitively 
obvious that I don’t know that my mug is empty in the demon world, and that the 
demon world just shows that knowledge is stranger than many of us thought. If it is 
intuitively obvious that I don’t know that my mug is empty in the demon world, this 
reply is exactly right. But it’s an empirical question whether people have the intuition that 
I lack knowledge in the demon world, and nobody has done the relevant study. And in 
any case, I lack this intuition, since the case doesn’t strike me one way or another. So at 
least at this point, attributor virtue epistemologists can’t respond to the arguments in §2 
by saying that it is intuitively obvious that I lack knowledge in the demon world. 
4. Conclusion  
While many contributors to the virtue epistemology debate also contribute to the 
pragmatic encroachment debate (and vice versa), nobody has noticed that the primary 
objection to pragmatism can be pushed even more forcefully against AVE. Why is this? 
Perhaps because, in many of the central cases discussed in the virtue epistemology 
literature, people are concerned with the presence or absence of the relevant virtues (not 
with whether some virtues that are present are causally responsible for the relevant 
belief), and the presence or absence of the relevant virtues typically makes exactly the 
truth-relevant difference that virtue epistemologists would want it to make. Take Jennifer 
Lackey’s “Chicago Visitor” case, for example.  
Chicago Visitor: Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris 
wishes to obtain directions to the Sears Tower. He looks around, approaches the 
first adult passerby that he sees, and asks how to get to his desired destination. 
The passerby, who happens to be a lifelong resident of Chicago and knows the 
city extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears 
Tower by telling him that it is located two blocks east of the train station. Morris 






Lackey presents Chicago Visitor as part of a dilemma for a species of virtue epistemology 
that she calls “the credit view.” According to the credit view, S knows that p only if she 
deserves credit for arriving at the true belief that p.10 The challenge for the credit view is 
that, while Morris seems to know where the Sears Tower is located, it’s the passerby who 
seems to deserve all the credit for Morris’s arriving at the true belief that the Sears Tower 
is two blocks east of the train station.  
In response to Chicago Visitor, credit theorists customarily argue that, unless we 
assume that Morris’s belief results from some ability to discriminate reliable from 
unreliable sources of information, we will have no reason to doubt (e.g.) that Morris 
could easily have asked a lost but overconfident tourist for directions instead of the 
reliable local that he happened to ask. But (the response continues), if he could just as 
easily have asked a lost tourist, it’s clear that his belief that the Sears Tower is two blocks 
east of the train station falls short of knowledge. Since Morris deserves at least partial 
credit for his true belief if his belief has resulted from some ability to discriminate reliable 
from unreliable sources of information (the response concludes), either Morris is credit-
worthy, or we have no reason to think that his belief counts as knowledge. Either way, 
we lack a clear case of knowledge without credit.11 According to Lackey, this response 
leads to trouble elsewhere. 12  But notice that this response appeals to truth-relevant 
differences between Chicago Visitor and the case where Morris could easily have asked a 
lost but overconfident tourist for directions. After all, the probability that Morris arrives 
at the true belief that the Sears Tower is two blocks east of the train station is much 
higher in cases where Morris can discriminate reliable from unreliable sources of 
information than in cases where it’s only by dumb luck that Morris asks a reliable local 
rather than a lost but overconfident tourist.   
Since we must consider bizarre scenarios like the demon world to see how intellectual 
virtues might fail to be truth-relevant, it is perhaps unsurprising that even those 
epistemologists who contribute to both the pragmatic encroachment debate and the 
virtue epistemology debate have failed to notice that AVE makes knowledge depend on 
truth-irrelevant factors. Places like the demon world show that the primary objection to 
                                                            
10 The credit view presumably entails AVE since, presumably, S deserves credit for her true belief that p only if 
her belief is the product of some intellectual virtue that she possess. If this is right, then everything I said above 
about AVE also applies to the credit view.   
11 See, for example, Riggs 2009 (p. 209), Greco 2007 (p. 63), and Sosa 2007 (p. 95).  
12 Lackey uses Chicago Visitor as part of a dilemma for the credit view rather than simply arguing that Chicago 
Visitor constitutes a straightforward counterexample to the credit view. As she argues, if we make the relevant 
notion of credit weak enough to count Morris as knowing where the Sears Tower is located, the credit view will 
have trouble denying knowledge in Gettier cases like Ginet’s fake barn case. Thus, concludes Lackey, the credit 
view either gets the wrong result in cases like Chicago Visitor, or it gets the wrong result in cases like Ginet’s 






interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more 
effectively against AVE. Since the vast majority of purported necessary conditions on 
knowledge are truth-relevant in at least the broad sense, it’s tempting to conclude that 
AVE makes knowledge depend not just on truth-irrelevant factors, but on fully 
epistemically irrelevant factors. To put my cards on the table, however, AVE illuminates so 
much in epistemology that I still find it attractive—perhaps even more so than any 
competing view. Since affecting whether a belief counts as knowledge seems sufficient 
for being epistemically irrelevant, I am uncomfortable saying that AVE makes knowledge 
depend on epistemically irrelevant factors. But in any case, the fact that AVE makes 
knowledge depend on factors that aren’t truth-relevant even in the broad sense, and the 
way that it also makes knowledge depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are 
truth-relevant in the narrow sense, clearly lend at least some credibility to alternative 
views.  
Appendix: Proper Functionalism 
According to the proper-functionalist views defended by Plantinga (1993, 2000), 
Bergmann (2006), and others, S knows that p only if her belief that p is the product of 
properly functioning cognitive faculties. Proper functionalism makes knowledge depend 
on truth-irrelevant factors, and depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-
relevant, in exactly the way that AVE makes knowledge depend on truth-irrelevant 
factors and depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant.  
We don’t beg any question against proper functionalism by stipulating that I know 
that my mug is empty here in the actual world. In the demon world, however, my belief 
that my mug is empty is no more the product of properly functioning cognitive faculties 
than my pulse would be the product of properly functioning organs if a paramedic who 
mistakenly thought I was having a heart attack preempted the normal beating of my 
heart by performing compressions on my chest. A world where the demon loves true 
beliefs but hates beliefs produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties would have 
exactly the same implications for proper functionalism as the world where the demon 
loves true beliefs but hates adroit beliefs has for AVE. If proper functionalism is true, 
the actual world and this demon world would give us a pair of cases that differ with 
respect to my knowledge even though they are identical on every truth-relevant 
dimension, even in the broad sense of this term. And a world where the demon never 
gives anyone a false belief would give us a case where I lose my knowledge in virtue of a 
truth-relevant difference that only makes it more likely that my belief is true, since my 






demon hates beliefs produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties create exactly 
the same trouble for proper functionalism as demon worlds where the demon hates 
adroit beliefs create for AVE.13  
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